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THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD IGNORES EVIDENCE WHICH WAS 
PRESENTED REGARDING THE PARTIES' MARITAL LIFESTYLE AND 
MS. PENROSE'S NEED 
In making its woefully insufficient alimony award, the trial 
court obviously failed to consider Mr. Penrose's own testimony 
regarding the parties' marital standard of living, and Ms. 
Penrose's established financial needs. In his brief, Mr. Penrose 
attempts to support the trial court's award by arguing that Ms. 
Penrose's father provided extensive financial support to the 
couple, and that Ms. Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive." 
Mr. Penrose not only ignores evidence which was presented regarding 
the parties' marital standard of living and Ms. Penrose's 
reasonable monthly needs, but he also completely disregards the 
trial court's express finding regarding his own monthly income. 
Mr. Penrose claims that the alimony awarded by the trial court 
is appropriate because the parties' admittedly lavish marital 
lifestyle was financed largely by Ms. Penrose's parents. This 
assertion mischaracterizes the evidence which was presented at 
trial. The trial court did find that Ms. Penrose's parents 
assisted the parties financially. This finding was apparently 
based on Mr. Penrose's testimony that Ms. Penrose's father, Lloyd 
Hansen, financed trips for the parties during their marriage, and 
provided the use of his condominium in Hawaii during the early 
1 
years of the parties' marriage, which allowed them to concentrate 
the development of their business. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 295-297)• 
However, the trial court also found that the parties' 
lifestyle was based, at least in part, on "the parties' own income 
from their businesses11 and "savings accrued from their Hawaiian 
business." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 9). 
Furthermore, Mr. Penrose admitted that much of the parties' 
lifestyle, particularly after they returned to Utah, was financed 
not by Ms. Penrose's father, but by his own income and resources. 
Specifically, it was the parties themselves, not Ms. Penrose's 
father, who purchased the parties' vehicles (including a Porsche 
and a $56,000.00 Mercedes), their $500,000.00 home in Holladay, 
their business, Designers Carpet Showroom, their interest in Utah 
Water Sports, and expensive gifts and jewelry, such as Rolex 
watches. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 384-387). The parties, through their 
marital income and assets, also were able to finance nannies and 
household help to assist in the care of their son. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 
379-380; Tr.Vol. I, p. 46). 
In light of Mr. Penrose's own testimony, this Court should 
disregard his argument that the parties' marital lifestyle was 
financed primarily by Ms. Penrose's parents. Rather, it was 
largely Mr. Penrose's own income from the parties' business, along 
with their savings from the business which they operated in Hawaii, 
that allowed the parties a somewhat lavish marital lifestyle. 
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Mr. Penrose also argues that Ms. Penrose's claimed monthly 
expenses were inflated. The trial court found that Ms. Penrose's 
average monthly expenses were approximately $3,800.00, despite the 
fact that the evidence established that her monthly expenses, based 
upon her marital standard of living, totalled not less than 
$5,974.04. In support of its finding, the trial court stated only 
that Ms. Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive." (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, fl 9) . Mr. Penrose claims that "the 
trial court had ample justification for finding that these expenses 
were inflated." See Brief, at p. 14. However, not only did the 
trial court fail to offer support for its Finding, it also failed 
to address the fact that Ms. Penrose's uncontroverted1 testimony 
established expenses of $5,974.04. 
In his brief, Mr. Penrose attempted to support the trial 
court's alimony award by stating that, based upon testimony by his 
accountant, Bret Wynn, his average monthly net income is only 
$5,833.00. See Brief, at p. 14. This assertion is directly 
contrary to the trial court's express finding that Mr. Penrose's 
income for purposes of determining awards of child support and 
alimony was $8,932.00 per month. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, f 5) . Mr. Penrose's claimed monthly income cannot be 
unsupported by the evidence. 
1
 Although Mr. Penrose stated that he thought some of Ms. 
Penrose's claimed expenses were "high," he offered no support for 
this conclusion, and had not seen any of her bills. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 244-246. 
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Based upon the trial court's finding regarding Mr. Penrose's 
established monthly income in the amount of $8,932.00, and Mr. 
Penrose's own testimony regarding the parties' marital lifestyle, 
this Court should overturn the trial court's award of alimony and 
direct that an award more commensurate with Mr. Penrose's income, 
Ms. Penrose's established expenses, and the parties' marital 
standard of living be entered. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION AND DIVISION OF MARITAL DEBTS AND 
PROPERTY IS PATENTLY INEQUITABLE 
In his Brief, Mr. Penrose also attempts to justify the trial 
court's improper valuation and inequitable distribution of 
property. The trial court awarded the parties' business, Designers 
Carpet Showroom, to Mr. Penrose, and valued the business at $0 for 
purposes of property division, despite its proven growth and 
earnings potential2. The trial court also awarded Mr. Penrose a 
cash asset to repay family debt, without doing the same for Ms. 
Penrose. Given the trial court's property and debt allocation, Ms. 
Penrose will be left with virtually no property after payment of 
debt she was ordered to assume. 
The trial court valued the parties' business at $0 for 
purposes of property division, due to a contingent sales tax 
2
 In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial 
court specifically stated that Designers Carpet Showroom has 
"significant value as evidenced by historical and present 
earnings." (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 13(a)) . 
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liability, the amount, if any, of which has yet to be determined. 
However, Mr. Penrose stipulated to Mr. Stephen Nicolatus's 
valuation of the business at $194,000.00 without consideration of 
the contingent tax liability, which is a far cry from the $0 figure 
assigned by the trial court. As Bret Wynn, a certified public 
accountant called to testify by Mr. Penrose stated, fla portion of 
the sales tax, one of the components of the sales tax is in 
question or, rather, is in negotiation and we feel fairly 
comfortable that the amount will be reduced, or a reduction of the 
existing liability." (Tr.Vol. II, p. 343). Additionally, exhibits 
"D" and "E" to Mr. Penrose's Brief state that the tax liability is 
only an "estimate." 
Furthermore, the trial court itself found that the business 
has significant value and earning potential. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, f 13(a)). Consequently, although testimony 
regarding the contingent sales tax liability may support the trial 
court's finding, the trial court utterly failed to consider the 
stipulated present fair market value of the business and its own 
statement regarding the business's future earnings potential, as 
well as the contingent nature of the tax liability, in valuing the 
business for property distribution purposes. 
Nor is there any evidence in favor of the trial court's 
valuation of the Key Bank certificate of deposit at $29,000.00 for 
property division purposes when it, in fact, has a value of 
$69,000.00 as established by the uncontroverted evidence. 
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(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5 13(c)). The trial 
court offered no rationale for valuing the asset at less than one 
half its value for property division purposes, other than the fact 
that Mr. Penrose owed $4 0,000.00 to his grandmother3. 
The trial court's failure to render a more equitable 
distribution and valuation of assets place Ms. Penrose at a 
substantial disadvantage. Mr. Penrose argues that the trial 
court's award effected an equal distribution of assets between the 
parties. What this argument fails to recognize is the fact that 
Ms. Penrose's debts amount to $107,981.314. Her property award 
consists of $109,000.00 from the parties' escrow account, her 
leased vehicle, and furniture. After payment of debts, then, Ms. 
Penrose will have little more than $1,000.00 in liquid assets. 
3
 Furthermore, the only evidence that was presented in 
support of Mr. Penrose's claim that he had in fact borrowed 
$40,000.00 from his grandmother was Mr. Penrose's own testimony, 
and the copy of a check from his grandmother's account. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 309-310). Mr. Penrose admitted that there is no written 
documentation evidencing the loan. Nor is there a written 
repayment agreement. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 381). 
4
 Mr. Penrose argues that Ms. Penrose's debt to her father 
should not be considered because it was incurred mainly after the 
parties' separation. See Brief of Appellee, p. 17. However, this 
argument ignores the fact that the date for determining valuation 
of assets is ordinarily the date of divorce, not separation, unless 
the court provides otherwise in the Findings of Fact or Decree of 
Divorce. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P. 2d 260 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) 
(valuation of asset at date of separation, rather than divorce, 
improper) . Here, the court made no such finding. In fact, the 
court made absolutely no finding as to whether Ms. Penrose's debt 
constituted marital or separate debt. The absence of such a 
finding constitutes reversible error. 
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Mr. Penrose, on the other hand, will have an asset of 
significant earning potential valued at $0, plus an asset to pay 
his debt, a certificate of deposit valued at $29,000.00 with an 
actual value of $69,000.00 as established by uncontroverted 
evidence, $69,000.00 from the parties' escrow account, and a 
Bronco, snowmobiles and a trailer, none of which are leased, as is 
Ms. Penrose's vehicle. The court's patently inequitable 
distribution of property and debt results in significant prejudice 
to Ms. Penrose; she is left with virtually no liquid assets, while 
Mr. Penrose, even after payment of debts, is left with assets in 
excess of $100,000.00. Such an inequitable division requires 
reversal on this ground alone. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD DOES NOT INCLUDE 
CONSIDERATION OF FACTORS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW AND 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Despite the fact that the parties' combined monthly income 
exceeds the highest guideline amount, and testimony which was 
presented regarding the benefits and opportunities enjoyed by the 
parties' minor child during the marriage, the court made no 
findings regarding the financial needs of the parties' child. Mr. 
Penrose's argument fails to address these factors. 
The trial court merely calculated the amount of the parties' 
combined monthly income, and set a base child support award based 
upon the guidelines. Clearly, the court was required to make 
specific findings as to the financial needs of Miles Penrose, 
7 
because extensive evidence was presented at trial regarding the 
parties' marital lifestyle, which included extensive travel, 
recreational opportunities, and private education for their son. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, 29, 188, 189). The court utterly failed to 
address the issue of whether Miles may continue such a lifestyle on 
a child support award of $669.00 per month, even though Mr. 
Penrose's income allows a higher amount. 
Mr. Penrose argues, based on Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 
(Utah Ct.App. 1996), that such specific findings were not 
necessary. However, the Ball court merely held that "linear 
extrapolation" from the guidelines is not appropriate where income 
exceeds the highest guideline amount. Id. at 1014. Ms. Penrose is 
not requesting such linear extrapolation; rather, she merely asks 
that the court "consider and make specific findings on all 
"appropriate and just" factors," as required by the Ball court. 
Id. at 1014. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES DOES NOT 
PROPERLY CONSIDER MS. PENROSE'S NEED 
The trial court ordered the parties to bear their own attorney 
fees and costs. Such an order given the facts of this case does 
not conform to the requirements of Utah law, which requires the 
trial court to consider of the parties' need and ability to pay in 
determining whether to award attorney fees. 
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The Findings of Fact state conclusorily, and erroneously, that 
Ms. Penrose has sufficient monetary assets, based upon the property 
division, to pay her own attorney fees. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, f 15) . The trial court's decision is 
apparently based on the property award, which granted Ms. Penrose 
$109,000.00 from the parties' escrowed funds. This is essentially 
the only asset awarded Ms. Penrose, other than her leased vehicle. 
However, the trial court's decision ignores the fact that Ms. 
Penrose is ordered to repay a debt to her father of over 
$100,000.00 out of her property award, of which legal fees 
constitute approximately one-third of the total amount. Ms. 
Penrose's father, Mr. Hansen, paid approximately $32,000.00 of her 
attorney fees. However, Ms. Penrose's claimed attorney fees total 
$89,239.02. Mr. Penrose's accusation of "double-dipping" simply is 
not supported by the facts. 
The trial court also failed to consider the fact that Ms. 
Penrose's imputed monthly income is much lower than Mr. Penrose's 
actual monthly income, a fact which is relevant both to Ms. 
Penrose's need and Mr. Penrose's ability to pay, two of the factors 
required to be considered by Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991), which were ignored by the trial court. 
Furthermore, Mr. Penrose's argument regarding the 
reasonableness of the requested fees is inapposite. Here, the 
trial court made absolutely no finding regarding the reasonableness 
of the requested fees. In determining reasonableness of requested 
9 
fees, a trial court may consider "the difficulty of the litigation, 
the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number 
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, 
and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved." Bell, 
at 493-94. 
Here, Mr. Penrose's attempt to compare Ms. Penrose's claimed 
attorney fees with his own fails to recognize the fact that Ms. 
Penrose presented extensive testimony regarding her unique 
circumstances; specifically, that she was forced to retain new 
counsel at a late date in the proceedings due to the untimely death 
of her prior counsel5. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award of alimony fails to allow Ms. Penrose 
to maintain the same standard of living she enjoyed during her 
marriage, which was sustained largely by the parties' own income 
and savings. Furthermore, the trial court presented no support for 
its finding that Ms. Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive," 
nor has Mr. Penrose advanced such support. 
The trial court's division of debts and property leaves Ms. 
Penrose with essentially no property, other than a leased vehicle, 
after payment of her debt. Mr. Penrose, on the other hand, was 
5
 Furthermore, although Mr. Penrose was allowed to present a 
proffer of his own attorney fees, no documentation regarding such 
fees was offered or received into evidence. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 409-
410) . 
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given a significant asset with which to pay his debt, as well as a 
business of proven economic value, both valued at $0 for purposes 
of property division. 
In setting the child support award, the court failed to 
consider the specific needs of the parties' minor child, an 
omission which is objectionable because the parties' combined 
monthly income exceeds the statutory guidelines. 
Finally, the court erred in requiring the parties to bear 
their own attorney fees without considering Ms. Penrose's need; 
specifically, the fact that Mr. Penrose's monthly income is 
significantly higher than Ms. Penrose's, and Ms. Penrose will be 
left with virtually no assets from the property division after 
payment of debt. * i 
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